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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2-(3)(j) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue: Did Judge Lay cock err when she interpreted section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) of the Utah
Code to require McKell, as a matter of law, to file its mechanic's lien foreclosure action within
twelve months after last furnishing labor, material, equipment and services to a non-residential
construction project, or within twelve months after cessation or abandonment of work on the
project, rather than "within 12 months from the date of final completion of the original contract
not involving a residence" as plainly stated in the statute?
Standard of Review: Judge Lay cock's ruling is subject to review under the correction of
error standard. Gerhich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999); Orton v. Carter, 970
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.., 47 P.3d
92, 94 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002); Coulter & Smith v. Russell,
976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (2001): Excerpted here; included verbatim in the Addendum.
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter
within:
(a) twelve months from the date of final completion of the original contract not
involving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or
last furnished equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-
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102.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below.

This is a mechanic's hen foreclosure action in which McKell seeks to recover the
reasonable value of labor, materials, equipment, and services furnished to Carter Construction &
Development, L.L.C. for the "Friday Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision" project in Utah
County, Utah. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. claims an interest in the property by virtue of a deed of
trust recorded on January 5, 2000, after McKell started work.
On November 21, 2001, McKell filed its complaint against Carter, Wells Fargo, and The
Ranches, L.C. in the Fourth District Court to foreclose a mechanic's lien McKell recorded on
November 2, 2000, and to obtain damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. (Record
6). Wells Fargo answered and counterclaimed on January 28, 2002. (Record 41). McKell
replied on February 11, 2002. (Record 47). On May 6, 2002, Wells Fargo filed its Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and supporting memorandum. (Record 50 & 57). McKell filed its
memorandum in opposition and the Affidavit of Gordon Erickson (a copy of which is included in
the Addendum) on May 17, 2002. (Record 66 & 99). Wells Fargo filed its Reply Memorandum
on May 29, 2002. (Record 77). Judge Laycock heard argument on the motion on June 26, 2002.
(Record 81). Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, Judge Laycock granted Wells
Fargo5s motion. (Record 82).
Judge Laycock entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 30, 2002.
(Record 89). The parties do not dispute the material facts, but McKell contests the following
Conclusions of Law:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law2Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15.

Final completion of an original contract as contemplated by Utah Code
Ann. Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), does not require that a mechanic's lien
claimant complete all work anticipated by the contract. While completing
all work anticipated by a contract will meet the requirement of "final
completion of an original contract" of Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), the cessation
and abandonment by a mechanic's lien claimant of work to be performed
under a contract also constitutes final completion of the original contract
as anticipated by Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a).

17.

Since Section 38-1-7 of the Utah Code Ann., requires a mechanic's lien
claimant to include the date on which the last work was performed in a
recorded mechanic's lien, the date the last work was performed as
contained in the recorded Notice of Mechanic's Lien is the date from
which the twelve (12) month period contained in Section 38-1-11(1 )(a)
runs.

18.

McKell last furnished work on the Real Property on October 5, 2000. The
twelve (12) month period during which McKell was required to file an
action to enforce its lien began to run on October 6, 2000 and ended on
October 5,2001.

21.

McKell's action to enforce its Mechanic's Lien against the Real Property
was not brought within the required twelve (12) month period.

22.

Based upon McKell's failure to bring an action to enforce its claimed
mechanic's lien within the twelve (12) month period, McKell's claimed
mechanic's lien is invalid.

(Record 84 - 86).
The court's initial Order Granting Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment was
certified as a final order on August 2, 2002. (Record 96). The parties filed a Stipulation as to
Amount of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award on September 10, 2002. (Record 107). The court
entered its Amended Order Granting Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 18, 2002 and certified this order as a final order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
(Record 114).
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II.

Statement of Facts.

The material facts are not in dispute and, with the exception of Facts 1,3, and 10, are
drawn from the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Record 89).
1.

Carter was the owner or reputed owner of the real property and improvements

constituting the "Friday Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision" in Utah County, Utah.
(Record 4, H15; 38, ^15).
2.

McKell entered into a contract (the Contract) with Carter to perform services and

materials to the real property known as Friday's Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision located
in Utah County (the Real Property).
3.

The total Contract price for the work, including a subsequent change order, was

approximately $204,000.00. (Record 98, f4).
4.

Wells Fargo made a loan(s) to Carter, secured by a trust deed(s) on the Real

Property, the trust deed(s) was executed on December 29, 1999, and recorded on January 5,
2000.
5.

On or about January 3, 2000, McKell began work at the Real Property under its

Contract.
6.

As McKell's work progressed, payments to McKell from Carter were extremely

slow. After repeated attempts to receive progress payments for work completed, as
contemplated by the Contract, McKell suspended work under the Contract on or about October
5, 2000.
7.

At the time McKell suspended work, approximately $28,972.69 remained due and

payable to McKell for work performed under the Contract.
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8.

As of October 5, 2000, the work anticipated by the Contract was not complete.

For example, the amount of the original contract earmarked for the sidewalk portion of the site
was $16,827.00, for which McKell had not yet billed Carter, as the work was to yet be
performed.
9.

McKell negotiated with Carter in an attempt to receive payment for work

performed prior to October 5, 2000. When Carter would not, or could not, pay for the portion of
work completed, McKell recorded a Mechanic's Lien on the Real Property. The Mechanic's
Lien was recorded on November 2, 2000.
10.

McKell intended to complete the work under the Contract upon receipt of

payment of the past due amount, and a guaranty of payment for the work yet to be completed.
(Record 97).
11.

As of both October 5, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the work to be performed by

McKell pursuant to the Contract had not been comple'ted. McKell has never completed all of the
work it was anticipated to perform under the Contract.
12.

On November 21, 2001, McKell brought this action to, among other things,

foreclose upon its Mechanic's Lien and have its Mechanic's Lien adjudged valid and prior to the
lien(s) of Wells Fargo on the Real Property

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Laycock incorrectly interpreted the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-11 l(l)(a) (2001) to require McKell, as a matter of law, to file suit to enforce its mechanic's lien
within twelve months after last furnishing labor, materials, equipment or services to the nonresidential construction project, or within twelve months after cessation or abandonment of work
on the Project. The plain language of section 38-1-11(1 )(a) requires mechanic's lien claimants to
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file suit to foreclose their mechanic's hen no later than twelve months after final completion of
an original contract not involving a residence. The plain meaning of "final completion" is that a
contract is not finally complete until everything required to be done under the contract is
complete. There is no dispute McKelPs contract with Carter, the owner of the Project, was not
finally complete on or before November 21, 2000. Consequently, McKell's lien foreclosure
action, filed on November 21, 2001, was timely. This interpretation is consistent with the
Legislature's intent when it enacted amendments to Utah's mechanic's lien statute which became
effective in 1994 and 1995, and with Utah law.

OVERVIEW OF AMENDMENTS TO THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE
The mechanic's lien statute in effect before May 2, 1994, required lien claimants to
record their mechanic's lien "within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or
improvement" and to file suit to foreclose the lien "within twelve months after the completion of
the original contract or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days." Utah
Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7(1) & 11 (emphasis added) Case law interpreting the version of section 381-11 in effect before May 2, 1994 established a two-part test for determining the timeliness of
the lien foreclosure action: first, whether the project was substantially complete; and second,
whether the project was accepted by the owner. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander &
Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). In 1994, the
Legislature amended the statute to distinguish between residential and non-residential projects.
In the 1994 General Session, Utah's elected representatives amended sections 38-1-7 and
11, changing the triggering events and times for recording and foreclosing a mechanic's line
dependent upon whether the project was residential or non-residential construction. Effective
May 2, 1994, lien claimants were required to record their lien "within 90 days from the date the
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person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or
improvement" and to foreclose the lien within "twelve months from the date the lien claimant
last performed labor and services or last furnished equipment or material on an original contract
not involving a residence" or within "180 days from the date the hen claimant last performed
labor and services or last furnished equipment or material for a residence..." 1994 Utah Laws
Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11). These amendments
remained effective until April 30, 1995, at which point the Legislature changed the statute again.
In the 1995 General Session, the Legislature changed the triggering event for recording
and foreclosing a mechanic's lien on a non-residential project. Effective May 1, 1995, lien
claimants were required to record their lien within "90 days from the date... of final completion
of an original contract not involving a residence..." and to foreclose the lien within "twelve
months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence..."
1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11)
(emphasis added).1

ARGUMENT
I.

McKell filed its mechanic's lien foreclosure action within the time
allowed by the plain language of section 38-1-1 l-(l)(a).

Because the McKell - Carter contract was not finally complete on or before November
21, 2000, McKell's lien foreclosure action filed November 21, 2001, was timely according to the
plain language of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a). The first step in understanding the intent of the
legislature is to consider the plain language of the statute under review. Johnson v.

The 2001 General Session amended section 38-1-11 yet again to add the current subsection (4),
but those changes are not relevant to the issues before the court. 2001 Utah Laws 198 (S.B.
254).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Redevelopment Agency, 913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1996). "According to traditional statutory
interpretation methods, we look to the plain meaning of unambiguous statutory language."
Pickett v. State, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "In construing a statute, we assume
that 'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.' " Id, quoting Savage Indus, v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991); Cox Rock Prods, v. Walker Pipeline
Constr., 752 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). . The court may look to dictionary definitions to
determine the plain meaning of statutory language. "Utah courts have a iong history of relying
on dictionary definitions to determine plain meeting.5 " Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C v.
State, 29 P.3d 650, 655 (Utah 2001); quoting State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986 (Utah 1999).
The Legislature intended for the time period within which a mechanic's lien claimant
must file suit to foreclose the lien on a non-residential project to begin to run when the original
contract between the contractor and owner is at its end. "Final" means "being the last of a series,
process, or progress; of or relating to the ultimate purpose or result of a process." Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 463 (1984). "Completion" is defined as "the act or process of
completing; the quality or state of being complete." Id at 269. "Complete" means "folly carried
out." Id. Applying these definitions to section 38-1-11(1 )(a), all of the requirements under the
original contract must be accomplished before the time to file suit to foreclose the lien on a nonresidential project begins to run. The Indiana Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in
Moduform, Inc. v. HanyH.

Verkler Contractor, Inc., 681 N.E.2d243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

There, the court was required to determine the legislative intent expressed in the Indiana statute
requiring claimants on a public project payment bond to file their action on the bond "within
sixty (60) days after the date of the final completion and acceptance of the public work." Id. at
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247; quoting Ind. Code. § 36-1-12-13.l(d)(e). Looking to the plain language of the statute, the
court concluded that final completion and acceptance "requires the project to be at its end. That
is, all of the work under the original project must be finished before 'final completion and
acceptance' can occur." Id at 248. Similarly, this court should apply the plain language test to
section 38-1-11(1 )(a) and conclude that the time for a mechanic's lien claimant to file an action
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on a non-residential project does not begin to run until all of the
actions required by the original contract are finished. Because the McKell - Carter contract was
not finally complete on or before November 21, 2000, McKell's lien foreclosure action filed
November 21, 2001, was timely.
This court should strictly construe the phrase "final completion of the original contract."
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993),
this the court upheld the validity of a liquidated damages clause which imposed a $600.00 per
day assessment if "any work shall remain" under the contract beyond the contract completion
date. Id. at 1370. The court reviewed the plain language of the contract and concluded it
authorized UDOT to assess liquidated damages until the project was finally complete, rejecting
the performance bond surety's contention that liquidated damages could not be assessed after the
project was substantially complete. The court wrote "The contract between the parties does not
consider substantial completion; rather, it considers final completion as determined by the
UDOT engineer. There is no ambiguity about this point. [The contractor] and UDOT could
have easily included the term and concept of'substantial performance' if they so intended." Id.
In the present case, had the Legislature wanted to start the time within which to file a lien
foreclosure action on a non-residential project at any time other than upon the "final completion
of the original contract," it would have done so, as it did for residences. The trial court should
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not, through a strained interpretation of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), be allowed to do what the
Legislature specifically elected not to do. This court should reverse and remand for further
proceedings.

II.

The plain language of section 38-l-ll(l)(a) does not require
mechanic's lien claimants to file a foreclosure action within twelve
months after a cessation or abandonment of the work. Judge Laycock
committed reversible error when she read this requirement into the
statute.

Judge Laycock committed reversible error when she interpreted section 38-1-1 l-(l)(a)
contrary to the plain language of the statute. After acknowledging the plain language of the
statute "requires a mechanic's lien claimant to file an action to enforce its mechanic's lien within
twelve (12) months from the date of final completion of the original contract" (Record 86), she
ignored the plain language of the statute and erroneously concluded, as a matter of law, that
Final completion of an original contract as contemplated by Utah Code Ann.
Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), does not require that a mechanic's lien claimant complete
all work anticipated by the contract. While completing all work anticipated by
contract will meet the requirement of "final completion of an original contract" of
Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), the cessation and abandonment by a mechanic's lien
claimant of work to be performed under a contract also constitutes final
completion of the original contract as anticipated by Section 38-1-11(1 )(a).
(Record 85-86).
The statute makes no mention of cessation, abandonment or suspension of work as being
synonymous with final completion. In fact, the Legislature specifically deleted suspension of
work as a triggering event for foreclosing a mechanic's lien when it amended section 38-1-11 in
1994. 1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) (deleting requirement for lien claimant to begin
foreclosure action within twelve months after suspension of work for a period of at least 30
days). Judge Laycock did not find that McKell materially ceased or abandoned work. Indeed,
she could not so find because the undisputed evidence is McKell intended to continue work after
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being paid for work previously performed and obtaining guarantees of payment for the
remaining work. (Record 97). "The determination of what constitutes material abandonment is
a factual issue." Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784
P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (summary judgment remanded for a determination
whether project was materially abandoned precluding architect's lien from relating back to
visible work on site). The Ketchum court noted with approval that a project was not materially
abandoned despite "a significant cessation of work... due to reasons not unheard of in
construction - loss of financing, failure to get a bond, and state approval..." Id., citing Frank J.
Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780, 786 (Md. 1973). Judge Laycock's interpretation
of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) reinstates language which Utah's Legislature specifically eliminated
from the statute in 1994. Utah law prohibits a court from adopting an interpretation which
rewrites a statute contrary to legislative intent. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650, 655. This court should
reverse Judge Laycock and remand for futher proceedings.

III.

The plain language of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) does not require a
mechanic's lien claimant to file a foreclosure action within twelve
months after last furnishing labor, equipment, materials or services to
a project. Judge Laycock committed reversible error when she read
this requirement into the statute.

Judge Laycock erred when she concluded, as a matter of law, that "Since Section 38-1-7
of the Utah Code Ann., requires a mechanic's lien claimant to include the date on which the last
work was performed in a recorded mechanic's lien, the date the last work was performed as
contained in the recorded Notice of Mechanic's Lien is the date from which the twelve (12)
month period contained in Section 38-1-11(1 )(a) runs." (Record 85). Applying her
interpretation of the statute to the facts of this case, the trial court erroneously concluded, as a
matter of law, that "The twelve (12) month period in which McKell was required to file an action
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to enforce its hen began to run on October 6, 2000 and ended on October 5, 2001." (Record 85).
Consequently, the court concluded McKell's action to foreclose its mechanic's lien was not filed
within the twelve month period required by the statute, and as a result, ruled the hen invalid.
(Record 84 & 85). The court's conclusion is completely contrary to the plain language of Utah's
mechanic's lien statute, and strays from the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute.
Judge Laycock's interpretation of the statute nullifies the 1995 amendments to Utah's
mechanic's lien statute. In those amendments, the Legislature estabhshed different requirements
for recording and enforcing a mechanic's lien based on the characterization of the project as
residential or non-residential. Specifically, the Legislature required lien claimants on nonresidential construction projects to record their lien no later than 90 days after final completion
of the original contract, and to file suit to foreclose the lien no later than twelve months after
final completion of the original contract. Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) (amendments codified
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-l-7(l)(b) & 1 l(l)(a)). For residences, the Legislature established not
only different time periods within which lien claimants must take action, but also started those
time periods running from a different event, specifically, the date the lien claimant last furnished
labor, materials, equipment, or services to the residence. On a residence, lien claimants must
record their lien no later than 90 days after last furnishing labor, equipment, materials, or
services to the residence, and must file suit to foreclose the lien no later than 180 days after last
furnishing labor, equipment, materials, and services. Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) & 1 l(l)(b).
The Legislature could have required a lien claimant on a non-residential project to file a
foreclosure action no later than twelve months after last furnishing labor, equipment, materials,
or services to the non-residential project, but did not do so. In fact, the Legislature specifically
deleted these events from triggering the running of the statute of repose for lien foreclosures on
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non-residential projects when it amended the statute in 1995. Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115).
Judge Laycock's interpretation of section 38-1-11(1 )(a) reinstates language which Utah's
Legislature specifically eliminated. Utah law prohibits a court from adopting an interpretation
which rewrites a statute contrary to legislative intent. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650, 655. Judge
Laycock's interpretation of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) is completely at odds with the Legislature's
amendments to Utah's mechanic's hen statute, and on this basis, the Utah Supreme Court should
reverse her ruling and remand for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
McKell respectfully requests the court to reverse Judge Laycock and to remand the case
for further proceedings.
DATED this ^ L day of June 2003.
PETERSON REED & WARLAUMONT L.L.C

!ck W. Reed
Mark S. Middlemas
Counsel for R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc.
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ADDENDUM

38-1-7

Notice

of

claim

-Contents

-Recording

-Service

on

owner

of

property.

(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of
the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to
hold and claim a hen within 90 days from the date:
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project
or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Section 3811-102.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom the lien claimant was employed or to whom the lien
claimant furnished the equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment
or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification;
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant;
(f) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent;
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of
Documents; and
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as" defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement
describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien
claimant to remove the lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is not required for any
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(4) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by
certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to:
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or
(ii) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien claimant, the copy of
the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the
affected property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes
the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record
owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing the
form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h).
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38-1-11 Enforcement —Time for —Lis pendens —Action for debt not affected —Instructions and
form affidavit and motion.
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within:
(a) 12 months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence
as defined in Section 38-11-102; or
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102.
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for
record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession
of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action.
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show
actual knowledge.
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt
may be due for any work done or materials famished to maintain a personal action to recover the
same.
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a
residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the
complaint on the owner of the residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the residence to
specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the motion for summary
judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after the service of the summons and complaint upon
the nonpaying party, as defined in Section 38-11-102, and the time for the nonpaying party to
respond, as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, has elapsed.
(c) The instructions and form affidavit and motion required by Subsection (4)(a) shall meet the
requirements established by rule by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(d) If the nonpaying party, as defined by Section 38-11-102, files for bankruptcy protection and
there is a bankruptcy stay in effect, the motion for summary judgment and the action to enforce
the lien shall be stayed until resolution of the related claim under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and form
affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or
enforcing the lien upon the residence.
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Prior Versions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11
Version effective from April 24, 1989 to May 2, 1994:
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording-Service on owner of property.
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 days after
substantial completion of the project or improvement shall file for record with the county
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written
notice to hold and claim a lien.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner,
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or
material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment
or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3. No acknowledgment or certificate is required
for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for-Lis pendens-Action for debt not affected.
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun within twelve months after the
completion of the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty
days. Within the twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record with the
county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real property,
or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action and the burden of proof
shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show such actual knowledge.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a
debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to
recover the same.
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Versions effective May 2, 1994.
1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87)
Ch. 308
S.B. No. 87

REAL PROPERTY-MECHANICS1 LIENS-RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTION AND LIEN
RECOVERY
FUND ACT
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents-Recording—Service on owner of property.
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall within 90 days from the date the person
last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or
improvement file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, or
some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or
material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment
or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment
or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for-Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected.
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within:
(a) twelve months from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last
furnished equipment or material on an original contract not involving a residence as defined in
Section 38-11-102; or
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102.
(2)(a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for
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record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession
of real property, or the hen shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action.
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show
actual knowledge.
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the
same.
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Versions effective May 1, 1995.
1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115)
Ch. 172
S.B. No. 115
LENS-RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTIONS-LIEN RECOVERY FUND
Section 1. Section 38-1-7 is amended to read:
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of
the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to
hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date;
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project
or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102, or
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Section 3811-102.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he tiirnished the equipment or
material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment
or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment
or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.

38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within:
(a) twelve months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a
residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102.

f
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(2)(a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the hen claimant shall file for
record with the county recorder of each county in which the hen is recorded a notice of the
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession
of real property, or the hen shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action.
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the hen claimant and those claiming under him to show
actual knowledge.
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the
same.
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Jack W. Reed, Utah Bar No. 4651
Jerald V. Hale, Utah Bar No. 8466
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-4040
Fax: (801) 364-4060
Attorneys for QED and Roger Minor

IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a
Utah corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON ERICKSON

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 010405004
vs.
CARTER CONSTRUCTION
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, a Utah limited
liability company d.b.a. CARTER
DEVELOPMENT; WELLS FARGO
BANK, N.A., a national banking
association; THE RANCHES, L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; and, DOES 1-25,

Judge Taylor

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
:ss.
)

[. Gordon Erickson, after first being duly sworn and upon oath do hereby state and depose as
follows:

\n>r\
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1.

The contents of this affidavit are true and accurate based on my own personal

knowledge. If requested to do so. 1 would so testify in a court of law.
2.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County and act as Controller for Plaintiff R. A. McKell

Excavating, Inc. I have functioned in this capacity for approximately 4.5 years.
3.

As part of my position with McKell, I became involved with the contract between

McKell with Carter Development for the improvement of the "Friday Station at Red Hawk Ranch
Subdivision" in Utah County Utah.
4.

The scope of the work under the Contract included sewer line, water line, storm drain,

and site work, including sidewalks. The total contract price for the work, including a subsequent
change order, was approximately $204,000.00.
5.

On or about January 3, 2000 McKell began work under the Contract.

6.

As work progressed, payment from Carter was extremely slow. After repeated

attempts to receive progress payments for work completed, as contemplated by the Contract, McKell
suspended work under the Contract on or about October 5, 2000.
7.

At the time work was suspended, $28,972.69 remained due and payable to McKell for

worked previously performed under the Contract.
8.

In addition, as of October 5, 2000, the sidewalk portion of the site work under the

original contract remained to be completed.
9.

The amount of the original contract earmarked for the sidewalk portion of the site work

was $16,827.00, for which McKell had not yet billed Carter, as the work was not yet performed.
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10,

McKell negotiated with Carter in an attemjp. to receive payment for work performed

prior to October 5, 2000. When Carter would not, or amid not, pay for the ponion of work
completed, McKell recorded a Mechanic's Lien on the pjnnerty compromising the Project on
November 2, 2000.
1L

As of November 2, 2000, the work underrne original contract between McKell and

Carter had not been completed, and to date has not beemxnmpleted by McKell.
12.

Upon payment of funds and guaranty thaitiinds would be available to pay for

remaining wok under contract, McKell has every intenticnT of completing the entire scope of work
under the Contract.
DATED this \£_ day of May 2002.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this (j^dmv rf May 2002.

^

ANGIE COWLEY
ffiT/WPUBUC* STATE of UTAH

i

t$S NORTH 1330 WEST B-1
O R E H U T 84057

miliM
KJ

COMMEXP 10-05-05
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* •*
. 'i*i- ;n District Couii
of Ut.ih Count\, State of Utah
CAM MA B.. VM">\ • lerk
Deputf

J. Randall Call (0541)
PRINCE, YEATES & Ghl ,U/Al i! .1 • 11
Attorneys for Wells Fargo ]hv\
Northwest, N. A
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, i n ^ . P ' l
(801) 524-1000

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COT JRT
IN AND F< )k i i I * •.'
:. -V MeKELL EXCAVATIiV
i ah corporation,

I\'J

FINDINGS O F FACT ANT)
CONCI X JSIONS O F LAW

ml
vs.
CARTER CONSTRUCTION
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a I Itah li in ited
liability company d.b.a. Carter
Development. L.J..C; WELLS FARGO
BANK, N.A.. a national banking
association; MIL RANCHES, L.C., a Utah
limited liability . . m ^ i , , -.:.( nnHS 1 25,

Civil No. 010405004
Judge Laycock

Defendants.

Un oi about JM-P. \ 'oo • ^

ji

- i ngoiitu-

^^

\i o i , Pargo") filed a Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings ("fvlolinn"! pursuant to Utah Rules ot Civil Procedure, Ku'e I "'(c)
Wells Fargo filed a Memorandum in Support ol IVlodon for Ji idgment on (he Plcadine("Memoranduni"). Plaintiff R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. ("JV
E, YEATES
DZAHLER
e I, Suite 900
t 400 South
,ake City
184111
J24-1000

•.

\i,»,
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Opposing Wells Fargo Bank's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Memorandum in
Opposition"). In support of its Memorandum in Opposition, McKell filed an Affidavit of
Gordon Erickson ("Affiant"). Wells Fargo filed a Reply Memorandum ("Reply").
A hearing was scheduled and held on June 26, 2002, at 10:00 a.m., before this Court.
J. Randall Call of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, appeared on behalf of Wells Fargo and Jack W.
Reed of Peterson Reed L.L.C., appeared on behalf of McKell.
Based upon the filing of the Affidavit in support of the Memorandum in Opposition, and
in accordance with Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Motion has been
treated by the Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having considered the Affidavit and having
heard the arguments of counsel, and all facts having been construed in the favor of McKell,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following findings of fact are limited to consideration of Wells Fargo's Motion.
Based upon the stipulation of counsel and the Affidavit of Gordon Erickson, the Court finds the
following facts.
1.

McKell entered into a contract ("Contract") with Carter Development, L.L.C.

("Carter") to perform services and materials to the real property known as Friday's Station at
Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision located in Utah County ("Real Property").

INCH, YEATES
GELDZAHLER
Centre I, Suite 900
a East 400 South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111
801) 524-1000
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2.

Wells K'tt'po made a lomHM li» f 'JIIIIT Devrlopmenl sceiiiril hy <i 'ri'sl dml!*:) *«i

;he Real Property, the trust deed(s) was executed on December 29, 1999, and recorded on

On or about J anuary 3, 2000, McKell began work at 'the Real Property under its
("oiitlracl.

As McKell' s work progressed, payments to McKellftom Carter were extremely T

4.

slow. After repeated attempts to receive progress payments i^r work completed. ,is
contemplated by the Contract, 'v:.-Ki - : .pi^-n.,1

.

-

.. .

5, 2000.
5.

At the l:i me McKell si ispended woi k, appi oxi mate ly $28,9 72,69 remained due

and payable to McKell for work performed under the Contract.
A' ' " vl ' * >' ** >! %< ii

6.

;

n yl

*<

the work, anticipated by the Contract was not complete

For example- the amounl ni die original contract earmarked for the sidewalk p =
• n. -\a;. >: -

oi.\ I»»I vxiinh McKell had not yet billed Carter, as the wo ik * r noi ,v.\

performed.
7.

McKell negotiated with Carter in an attempt to receive payment for work

performed prior to October 5, 2000. When-ranr? M ^-

»

of work completed, McKell recorded a Mechanic's I ien on the Real Property. The Mechanic's
Lj e n

CE, YEATES
LDZAHLER
itre I, Suite 900
ist 400 South
t Lake City
ah 84111
) 524-1000

was

recorded on November /' '00(1.
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8.

As of both October 5, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the work to be performed by

McKell pursuant to the Contract had not been completed. McKell has never completed all of
the work it was anticipated to perform under the Contract.
9.

On November 21, 2001, McKell brought this action ("Action") to, among other

things, foreclose upon its Mechanic's Lien and have its Mechanic's Lien adjudged valid and
prior to the lien(s) of Wells Fargo on the Real Property.
10.

Wells Fargo has incurred fees in defending against McKell's claims and in

bringing the Motion.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
11.

With respect to the Motion, there are no material disputed facts.

12.

The Court makes no interpretation of law regarding the applicability or non-

applicability of Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-1 l(l)(b) to the facts of this case.
13.

Utah Code Ann., Section 38-l-ll(l)(a) applies to the facts of this case.

14.

Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) requires a mechanic's lien claimant to

file an action to enforce its mechanic's lien within twelve (12) months from the date of final
completion of the original contract.
15.

Final completion of an original contract as contemplated by Utah Code Ann.,

Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), does not require that a mechanic's lien claimant complete all work
anticipated by the contract. While completing all work anticipated by a contract will meet the
requirement of "final completion of an original contract" of Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), the cessation
-4NCE, YEATES
5ELDZAHLER
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ialt Lake City
Utah 84111
01)524-1000
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and abandonment by a mechanic's lien claimant of work to be performed under a contract also
constitutes final completion of the original contract as anticipated by Section 3R * *1 (W.^
10.

Snlioii IS I i h f lul" li" ,, nuf MM .iff!" 11itI \ fiiiiot l r tnferpiefnl !•• «i- ,u> •n.ii "

mechanic's lien claimant has no cause of action to enforce a mechanic's lien unless and until the
mechan ic's lien claimant performs all * "ork anticipated I: •} • the subject contract

Si ich an

interpretation would require mechanic'*- hen claimants to complete contracts even if the owner
and/ oi . K •«. i-. '• *. v

.- i.. • • i..:. ...Mitracts.

Sinr.i/ Sirfinri sX \ 7 ul" tlic Utah Code Ann., requires a mechanic's lien claimant
to include the date on which the last work was performed i n a recorded mechanic's lien, the
date the last work was performed as contained in the recorded Notice of Mechanic' < 1 ini is I lie
date from, which the twelve (12) month period contained in Section 38 i I W her- • m>
18.

McKell hisll luiiiishcd vumk on ilie k<\'il hnpcilv <

twelve (12) month period during which McKell was required u* iile an action to enforce its lien
began tc i i in :»! i October 6, 2000 and ended on October 5, 2001
19

McKell filed its action to enforce its claimed Mechanic's Lien on November 21,

200] , approxi mately foi ty seven (4 7) da.) "s af tei the October 5, 2001 date,
20.

'riie penalty for not commencing an action to enforce a mechanic's lien within

Hie dvelve mmilli jienod i'» invalidation of the lien

Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State

Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738, 751 (Utah 1990).
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21.

McKell's action to enforce its Mechanic's Lien against the Real Property was not

brought within the required twelve (12) month period.
22.

Based upon McKell's failure to bring an action to enforce its claimed mechanic's

lien within the twelve (12) month period, McKell's claimed mechanic's lien is invalid.
23.

Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-18 provides that the successful party to a

mechanic's lien action is entitled to receive its costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Dated this ffl_ day of July, 2002.
COURT:

c*n/cClaudia Lay
Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the /J2^ day of July, 2002, I caused a true and conect copy of
the foregoing un-execi itecl FIN DINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF I , \ W t< > be
mailed, first class postage prepaid thereon t<- \W. following:
Jack W. Reed
Jerald V. Hale
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah

G:URC\DCXTS\wclL;i'argtAMcKcll\Findings and Conclusioris2.WTxl
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Pita, <f- g~(£L
'-ourtr, Judicial D i s t r H r ^ - f
of Utah County, State of Utah
C A R M A B . SMITH, Clerk
•o-jty

Randall Call (0541)
; imes A. Boevers (0371)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
\ilnrneys for Wells Fargo Bank
Northwest, N.A.
ity Centre I, Suite 900
: 75 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 524-1000

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, S I A 1 k (>b I i'l'AH
,\ MeKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a
'irih corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING
WELLS FARGO'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
CARTER CONSTRUCTION
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company d.b.a. Carter
Development, L.L.C.; WELLS FARGO
H \NK, N. A . a national banking
association; THE RANCHES, 1,C, a
I Hah limited Inbibry company ,(iu! Hi )\ .••

Civil No. 010405004
Judge Laycock

i 23,

Defendants.

Wells Fart'..'-

i v i < I !•

Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion") came befoie fhe <*'.>un -H. Imie 26, 2002, at 10:00
a.m., for oral argument. B;
DE, YEATES
LDZAHLER
itre I, Suite 900
ist 400 South
Lake City
ah 84111
| 524-1000

:i; . i .in atfiii.ivi; I •. K \ McKell Excavating.

Inc. ("McKell") in opposition to the Motion, the Motion was considered and treated by this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court as a motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Wells Fargo was represented by J. Randall Call of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler,
and McKell was represented by Jack W. Reed of Peterson Reed L.L.C.
Having considered the pleadings and papers filed in support of and opposition to
the Motion, having considered the Affidavit of Gordon Erickson and having heard and
considered the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, and for the reasons
contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered by this Court,
and based on the Stipulation of Wells Fargo and McKell as to the amount of attorneys' fees
and costs to be awarded Zions pursuant to paragraph 4, below, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Wells Fargo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, considered and

treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is granted;
2.

Based upon McKell's failure to file its action to enforce its claimed

mechanic's lien within twelve (12) months of last furnishing work on the Real Property, being
October 5, 2000, McKell's mechanic's lien recorded on November 2, 2000, as Entry Number
87075:2000, affecting the real property described on Exhibit "A" hereto ("Real Property"), is
hereby invalidated and shall no longer be a lien upon the Real Property;
3.

McKell's First Cause of Action to enforce its mechanic's lien is dismissed

with prejudice. McKell's remaining causes of action shall be unaffected by this Order;
RINCE, YEATES
5c GELOZAHLER
I Centre I, Suite 900
75 East 400 South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111
»orn\ cnA inr»n
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4.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

§ 38 1 18, Wells Fargo is awarded its

reasonable attorneys' fees; trie! costs against Is IcKell in th : amoi int :>f $2. 400 00 ('" I 'w o
Thousand F u n Hundred ! ><H
5.

'' -i

•

:

'

. -

. i ;;e ei iter ed as a final jiid.giii.erit on

iVIYKells c h u n s against Wells Faigu, and Welh F a r g o ' s claims against McKell in this action.
*Vi .msi iiu. • ;;dci does not extend to McKell f s claims against defendants Carter Construction
i K'v-.'lopinc/Mi, L . L . C .

•

•• <:-

•

•• •

-• -' '' - > ' , ! ! • ••*-

!1>,>

against McKell, the summary judgment adjudicates fewer than ih *i il- mulupk riainis m ihe
•

;

jt.'Si

• '* --.n!

•• •

(».: .

* . • acnon. Consequently, mere is i:-.t

reason ioi dcLw in entering final judgment on Wells Fargo's Motion because any

prospective appeal relates only to the timeliness of McKell's lien foreclosure action. Further,
resolution of the issues which remai n in the ti ial coi n t * ill not iiecessarily resolv 2 prospective
appellate issues. Therefore, this Order granting defendant Wells Fargo Bank's Motion shall
he and the same is lielemiiuul hi h< .1 Im.il jikkunenl puiMUiil In / uih A t /r /". vj(h)
DATED this h<_ day of

J^P,
A

lF

2002.
/ ATBY

1 1 IE COT I R I

>Y

$ '• '^..••^^'••J^HS^Bble Claudia Laycock
& !• £ % ^ WMtrlHt Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

ICE, Y E A T E S
ELDZAHLER
ntre I, Suite 900
ast 400 South
It Lake City
tah 84111
I) 524-1000

U^ETERSON REED L.L.cT
Jack W. Reed
Attorneys for R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the /

day of September, 2002, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER GRANTING WELLS FARGO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid thereon,
to the following:
Jack W. Reed
Jerald V.Hale
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Z^^XPt^

- ^ ^ ^ i > - <
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EXHIBIT 'A'
Legal Description

Lots 1 through 23, Inclusive, of Proposed Friday's Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision, Plat
"A", said Lots are to be Included within the following described property:
Commencing at a point which is South 00«18'58" East 387.52 feet along Section line and East
77434 feet from the West quarter corner of Section 20, Township 5 South, Range 1 West^ Sal
Lake Base and Meridian; thence 170.018 feet along the arc of a ™ M % ^ £ ° % £ ? £ ? .
left (chord bears South 8r09'59» East 166.14 feet); thence Northi 71«33'54
^
8
^
thence 2 7 3 9 feet along the arc of a 171 foot radius curve to the left, * o r d b « . « . N o r t h
76°09<16" East 2 7 3 6 feet); thence 39.46 feet along the arc of a SO foot radius curve to the left
(chord bears North S8°08'13" East 38.44 feet); thence 106.10 feet along the arc of a_S0_foot
radius curve to the right, (chord bears South 83°40'40" East 87.28
^
^
^
^
\
Q
East 79.11 feet: thence North 71-0T43" E « t f " » ^
'
^
^
3 7 5 67 ^ t h e n c e
feet; thence South 22°33'45" West 18.82 feet; thence South 17 26 1 7 ^
^ ' °
' <,
h
North 71-40-37" West 78.04 feet; thence North 85°19'33" West 53.100 feet; thence: South
73-16-39" West 349.92 feet; thence South 8 4 « 2 « 9 " West 79.94 feet; ^ " ^ " J 9 ^
West 133.25 feet; thence South W W
West^0.91 feet; ^
^ t h 0 20 06 W « t 91
feet; thence South 71°33'54" West 45.71 feet; thence North 87 09 59 West i v o .
,

'

North 24=06'05" East 42.00 feet to the point of beginning. (To be known as F n d a y s Station
Red Hawk Ranch Plat "A")

TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the above-described real P " * * ^ * ™ ^
^ ^ S
or hereafter vacated alleys and streets abutting the same, and all casements, rights of way. a ^ £ ™ ~ r ; . ^^
ncts^
an absolute assignment of rents and the rights and authorities given herein to Lender to collect_ana ^ ^
^ m m
royalties, mineraL oil and gas rights and profits, water, water rights, and water stock a ^ ^ V M > b a M m , muerUls.
connection with the property, and all fixtures, machinery, equipment, engine*, b t a i « w j « • ° ^ ^ o f w
or
appliances, tangible personal property and goods of every moire whatsoever now or hereafter ^ V ^
f applying or
t e n d e d to ^ T used in connection with the property, including, but not limned to. those for the purposes ol^
P J ^
distributing heating, cooling, electricity, gas, water, air and light; and all elevators, and r c ^ ^ ^ r s
water closed.
Ore prevention and ooingriishing apparatus, security and access control apparatus, J ™ " ^ ! ™ ^
c a ^ E c a < paaelhiig.
dnki. awnings, storm windows. -.storm doors, screens. Winds, dudes, .curtain* a a ^ r t a i n r ^ . ^ S d o o r & £ & « all of
rags, attached floor coverings; telephone equipment, trees and pktfi:. fence* .security systems ^ ^ J f T & e
<~ l
which, including replacements for. accessions. moduTcauoos. and additions thereto, shall be deemeo
p«
property covered by (his uasirumcoi.
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